Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological Building on and extending Fodor’s earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat of. Mind. ( hence. RTM. ; for discussion see., among other sources.,. Fodor.,. FA. ; Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of. Mind Jerry Fodor, as the leading philosophical exponent of cognitive science, has sparked.
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Same with grue, same with disjunctive properties, etc. Most of the times researchers just seem to be assuming the commonsense content attribution — which is ok, of course, but would hardly count as scientific evidence against a certain psychosemantic theory.
Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
Vision builds in certain assumptions and defeasible heuristics about the world and how it is carved up into objects to help us settle on a single interpretation of visual stimuli. In terms of the visual system concern specifically, I have a few thoughts.
In terms of explanatory impotency of these informational states, that is not something that can easily be leveled at Dretske. Senor – – Philosophical Psychology 5 2: Notice that it is a perfectly good evolutionary selectionist story to say that the visual system represents facial symmetry. About your new premise 1: This is some basis for saying that it does not represent flies per se, but rather fodog dots, but that representing moving black dots is part of a good way to catch flies.
Is it something phenomenological? This is not an original point. Eric Mandelbaum – – Inquiry: This langauge I think was originally from Sejnowski. It might use something much simpler like the spike rate or count because such things can more readily influence downstream neuronal networks.
This strikes me as being the wrong way to proceed. Well, that a tomato is psychoaemantics, in both cases. A Reply to Fodor.
I look forward to having a closer look, and at the dissertation too. Could the purported demise of teleosemantics be just a symptom of a more general dissatisfaction with direct reference theories?
Was Psychosemantics a Failure? – The Brains Blog
Millikan is also focused on the output-side of things pushme-pullyou. Obviously brains absorb and use information to get about in the world. Some good partial answers may have been given to important questions—but not the exact questions that Dretske and Fodor were trying to answer. But then I wonder why we think the system is representing in a more fine-grained way—is it just that it seems that way from the first-person perspective?
I take that as a hallmark of human rationality which is more than just instrumental rationality.
foodor One new interesting take on the area is coming from Berkeley philosophy Hannah Ginsborg. Dretske brought the baby back in from the puddle of bathwater, and the baby is here to stay even though it is not sufficient and nobody has ever said it was sufficient: Thanks for the response, Dan!
Is that an example of content being influenced by other mental states? I take it something up-stream like inferential role does the disambiguating.
Sounds right to me Adam. Gary Gates, back at Brown.
Fodor – – In Psychosemantics. I was one of the Berkeley PhDs there. Not sure about Millikan, but Dretske handles them by positing an original set of basic concepts e.
PGS writes great stuff!
I just read this stuff myself and I can see the problem that many folks have been talking about. RV has it that the intentional content of verbal episodes is derived from cognitive states. About that, I am not sure of the weight one should give to the animal communication literature, when it comes to content attributions to animal mental states.
Maybe you should have a fight with Dan about that. Consider simultanagnosia, the disorder in which subjects see literally one object at a time. The latter reflects light similarly to how a detached rabbit liver does. Let symmetry as tracked by the visual system be tracked by the intermediate system and let what is output by the intermediate system again be correlated with fitness as is symmetry. This is the problem for philosophers: One issue that seems to be looming here is how exactly we should conceive of the relationship between work in cognitive neuroscience and the philosophical project of naturalizing determinate content.
One might think that there are some who insist that accounts of representation must do certain explanatory work, and are pessimistic, and others that think that more modest and worthwhile explanatory goals are within reach.
I take it that your argument goes something like this: That strikes me as a problem for informational semantics.
Well, at least you guys know that there is this problem with getting the contents right with teleosemantics. This happens to conform to what we see in simultanagnosia e. Anyway, I think you give an uncharitable interpretation of what I would put in premise 1.
Nobody has ever said that informational states are sufficient. I have no idea. You want to deny this? What evolution designed here are not, in general, specific concepts, but a concept formation mechanism.
Find it on Scholar.